SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON BETWEEN RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY

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The articles in this report are the outcome of two years of productive and fruitful meetings, discussions, and collaboration between Saint Joseph University’s Political Science Institute (ISP), UNHCR, and RDPP. Our story started in February of 2015. At the time, the refugee question was pressing in the country, and the Political Science Institute had no courses and very little research around forced migration. We planned with UNHCR a series of classes, a workshop, and a conference on Forced Migration in collaboration with the Oxford Refugee Center represented by Dawn Chatty, Suzan Akram, and Catheryn Costello held in March of 2015. Topics covered the latest research on forced migration, positive and negative trends, the role of the EU, legal frameworks and the role of international courts, a comparison of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey’s responses, and discussions with guests from public and private institutions (Dr. Khalil Gebara, Advisor of the Minister of Interior, Georges Corm, Professor at ISP, and Jonathan McIvor from Siren Associates). Attendance was massive, and the impact was tremendous. Interest developed and discussions continued over the entire semester. At the same time, we had just launched an undergraduate course on migration which started to take off and gain interest. Students and faculty quickly embraced the topic, pulled their sleeves up, and sought to move from seminars and discussions to exploration and research. The train was set in motion. This is when, in April of 2015, we met UNHCR staff again to discuss the possibility to start a field survey on refugee perception of security. Usually one would expect things to move relatively slowly when a large university is setting up a field project with an international organization; but within 3 months, collaboration was established, funds insured, project approved on both sides, objectives discussed, a team of 20 students was set up, field methodology was prepared, and 120 towns across Lebanon were visited to collect 1800 surveys in June of 2015! The team included Lebanese and Syrian students. Some of them had never been out of Beirut, and all of them had never done any field work. The field visits were an amazing opportunity to learn about scientific methodologies, reflect on forced migration topics, discover the country, listen to stories on the ground, and learn to work together. Once the data was collected, the team (students and professors) analyzed the findings and students were media-trained to present the results in a press conference... Again, great synergies and interest from the community. A second follow-up survey was organized a year later, in August of 2016, to assess change in indicators with the same dynamics and format, in collaboration with OURSE (Observatoire Universitaire de la Realité Sociale et Economique, USJ). ISP students and faculty have taken the train driver’s seat.
In the following academic year (2016-2017), other lecturers were invited in collaboration with UNHCR to teach Master-level classes and encourage further research. Suzan Banki (University of Sydney) gave lectures in the Fall of 2016 on human rights and forced migration using an innovative role-based simulated approach and initiated a collaborative project with Relief and Reconciliation for Syria, an NGO working in the Akkar through which students organized an activity with local refugee youths. Helena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (University College London) and Catherine de Wenden (Science Po, Paris) taught a course in the Spring of 2016 on Human Rights Protection of Vulnerable Groups and Forced Migration and initiated sixteen research papers on the topic. Wenden and her students also met the Minister of State for Refugees, Mou’een el-Meherbi, to discuss policies and strategic choices made by the Lebanese Government. In the meantime, ISP was approached by many organizations and donors for other projects and studies on forced migration, including the collaboration on the building of a library in a refugee school in Akkar, and a study on Syrian refugee children’s access to education in Lebanon which was disseminated in March of 2016. In 2017, ISP lecturer Rita Chemaly participated in the production of a MOOC on gender based violence in the context of migration. Refugee issues have also become one of the central concerns of the Arab Master’s programme in Democracy and Human Rights that the Institute now coordinates. An increasing number of students, researchers, and partners are hopping on the train, and taking it several stations farther!
To make a long story short, collaboration with UNCHR and RDPP was the beginning of a long journey with many innovations at ISP, including field surveys, new pedagogical tools, new undergraduate and graduate courses which are now part of the curriculum, MOOCs, workshops, conferences, interviews with policy-makers, field projects and simulations, which led to rising interest and research on forced migration. Today we have at least 4 master papers every year written on forced migration, and several publications submitted to various journals by graduating students and faculty. We have an increasing number of local, national, regional and international partners joining us in our research and activities on refugee issues; there are ongoing projects on this topic at all times.

As Lebanon enters a long overdue electoral year, the refugee question is again a pressing issue that inflames political discourses and public feelings; the government and the international community will need to rely on research, policy papers, and the assessment of various stakeholder demands relating to this issue. ISP will be here to accompany developments and support constructive collaboration between international organizations, civil society, public institutions, media and academia; between juniors and seniors; between refugees, hosts, observers, and decision makers... The train is going on high speed with additional passengers and to new destinations!

Carole Alsharabati
Director of the Political Science Institute at USJ

We would like to thank UNHCR for supporting us in setting firm tracks for refugee studies within the Institute of Political Science, RDPP for providing the fuel, Dawn Chatty, Suzan Akram, Catheryn Costello, Suzan Banki, Helena Fiddian and Catherine de Wenden for the teachings and contributions. We also thank Saint Joseph University, the Rectorate, and the Ethics Committee for their trust. We are also grateful to OURSE (Observatoire Universitaire de la Réalité Socio-Economique, USJ) for the contribution in the field work, Jacqueline Harfouche and Chohig Kasparian for their technical support, ISP professors for their participation including Rita Chemaly and Wissam Lahham, NGOs Peace Initiatives and Relief and Reconciliation for working with us, General Elie Darazi for helping our teams access all areas in Lebanon, and the surveyors’ team: Mario Abd El Ahad, Nadim Abou Ali, Zain-Alabdin Ali, Jassem Alnaemat, Dania Bek, Mohammad Belal Alkheja, Youmna Cham, Zeinab Chour, Diab El Assaad, Reem El Mir, Jean Pierre Estephan, Dana Farhat, Khatchig Ghosn, Amjad Hammoud, Mohammad Hassan, Khalil Hojejij, Gabriella Jabbour, Hussein Kamareldine, Ali Kantari, Jomana Khamous, Gabriella Jabbour, Hussein Kamareldine, Ali Kantari, Jomana Khamous, Claudia Louca, Katia Mousaoumay, Tania Moussaoumay, Joelle Nassif, Rasha Salah, Mohammad Sarhan, Mousa Shammas, Nour Sleiman, and Inès Zaki.
Martina Zucconi focuses on the entry and renewal procedures for Syrians in Lebanon, supported by a series of interviews with a sample of 15 Syrian refugees aged 15 to 60 years old from the region of the Beqaa and in Beirut, some of whom have sponsors while others have been sponsored at some point. This paper sheds light on the sponsorship system (Al-Kafalah) for Syrians in Lebanon, hypothesizing that the sponsorship and subsequent conditions for entry of the country enhances Syrian refugee vulnerability towards exploitation and reinforces inequality between Lebanese citizens and “internally displaced Syrian people”. The paper calls for alternate measures to facilitate refugee legal status processing by accommodating them without the sponsorship system.

Martina Zucconi graduated from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice with a Bachelor of Middle Eastern Studies and Languages. She continued her academic career in Venice and Beirut, where she completed her Master’s Degree in Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa in July 2017. Martina volunteered with several NGOs both in Italy and in different Arab Countries. She worked as an intern at the European Volunteer Centre in Brussels. She mainly worked as research assistant, language teacher and children educator but also volunteer as protection officer and human rights activist in her country of origin and abroad.

Hind Sharif’s paper challenges the current hypothesis that refugees solely depend on humanitarian responses from state and non-state actors such as NGOs. Through in-depth interviews with Palestinian and Syrian refugees in the Shatila camp in Lebanon and UNRWA staff members, this paper elaborates the question of refugee-refugee humanitarianism, which has been neglected and rarely investigated by academia. Whilst sharing examples of refugee-led initiatives by “established” Palestinian refugees in Shatila to support the “new” Syrians in the camp, the research seeks to amplify our understandings of refugees’ responses to displacements and challenge representations that frame displaced people as passive victims in need of outside help. The paper also raises the issue of mounting pressure between Palestinian refugees and the “new” refugees, and raises the question of long-term sustainability of refugee-refugee humanitarianism in the light of the current humanitarian system.

Hind Sharif holds an MA degree in Human Rights and Democracy in the MENA Region from The European-Inter University Centre for Human Rights. In the past years, Hind has been involved in a number of research and advocacy activities concerning women’s rights and refugees in the Arab region. She is currently a Schuman Fellow at the European Parliament in the Human Rights Actions Unit.
Francisco Astudillo Poggi investigates the reasons behind sex trafficking of refugee women using the concepts of personal exogenous vulnerability, typical and atypical vulnerability introduced by Uribe and Gonzalez. He relies on literature review and environmental scanning to examine legal, economic, cultural, personal, and other variables behind refugee women vulnerability and sex trafficking. The study shows that Syrian refugee women are suffering from a multiplicity of vulnerabilities that increase the probability to become victim of sexual violence, and further develops every aspect of these vulnerabilities. In addition, intersectionality turns out to be an important element in this phenomenon which needs to be taken into consideration when tackling sex trafficking of Syrian refugee women.

Francisco Astudillo Poggi is a Venezuelan Lawyer who earned his Law degree (B.A) in 2015 from Universidad Católica Andres Bello in Caracas, Venezuela. In 2017, he obtained a Master in Democratic Governance: Democracy and Human Rights in the MENA Region taught by the European Inter-University Center of Human Rights and Democratisation and Università Ca’ Foscari of Venice, Italy, where he also had the opportunity to write his dissertation entitled “The Vulnerability of the Syrian Refugee Women in Lebanon and the Sex Trafficking” in Saint Joseph University (USJ).

Danaé Coquelet explores UNHCR’s resettlement practice by assessing the resettlement knowledge of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (SRL) and identifying their expectations. She conducted an exploratory quantitative study by collecting data through a standard questionnaire targeting a sample of 291 SRL, mostly in the Bekaa Valley and in Beirut. Findings show that Syrian refugees in Lebanon are well aware of the existence of UNHCR’s resettlement programme, but they lack understanding of its functioning and often ignore conditions attached to the resettlement procedure. SRL view resettlement as a path towards a greater enjoyment of their rights, notably the rights of personal security, education and work. SRL also emphasise the importance of human dignity in the context of forced displacement and identify Canada as the country that is most likely to secure their rights.

Danaé Coquelet graduated from the European Master’s in Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC). She is specialised in gender and refugee law and now works as an intern for UNHCR’s Protection Unit for Belgium and Luxembourg in Brussels. Danaé is the author of “Resettling Hope: Expectations versus Reality Approach to the Resettlement in Belgium of Syrian Refugees from Lebanon”, a research carried out in partnership with Saint Joseph University (USJ) of Beirut.
FLORIANE SOULIÉ
LES REPERCUSSIONS ECONOMIQUES DE LA CRISE SYRIENNE AU LIBAN

Depuis le début de la guerre en Syrie, l’arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens au Liban alimente l’imaginaire d’hommes politiques, de journalistes et de citoyens, qui voient dans cet accueil les raisons de tous les maux de la société, et le point d’entrée du Liban dans la crise économique. La réalité est cependant bien plus nuancée et complexe, et les bouleversements économiques que subit le pays du Cèdre sont multicausaux. Cette contribution vise alors à discuter ces impacts, en proposant une analyse multi-scalaire plus nuancée, prenant en compte diverses facettes liées à cette problématique.

Floriane Soulié a été formée à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, dans laquelle elle a effectué une double licence en histoire et sciences politiques, puis un M1 de sciences politiques spécialisé en relations internationales. Actuellement en année de césure au Liban, elle travaille chez Lebanon Support, en tant que stagiaire auprès du Civil Society Knowledge Center.

CAROLE ALSHARABATI
SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON: RESILIENCE AMIDST SECURITY MEASURES AND SAFETY CONCERNS

Carole Alsharabati, Jihad Nammour, and Ammar Younas attempt to measure perceptions of security of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in light of the policies enacted by the Lebanese government. The authors will control for various social, economic, and other indicators, and take into consideration interaction with the host community. Two surveys were done in 2015 and 2016, at a 12-months interval. On the Syrian side, results show some economic resilience, while vulnerability increases with regards to security, mobility, and assaults, due to absence of legal papers. In parallel, on the Lebanese side, dynamics go in the opposite direction, as there is an increase in feeling of security coupled with economic frustration. However, the two communities remain distant socially and Lebanese respondents recognize the impact of media on their perceptions.

Carole Alsharabati is the Director of the Political Science Institute at Université Saint Joseph in Beirut where she also teaches statistics, game theory, macroeconomics, political economy, conflict resolution, negotiation, and political communication. Carole provides consulting on security sector reform. In 2014, Carole participated in the creation and launching of an anti-Corruption whistleblowing NGO (Sakker El Dekkene). Carole has further consulted for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Lebanese Ministry of Interior on electoral reform. Carole holds a PH.D. in Political science from Claremont Graduate University with emphasis on international relations and quantitative methodology.
JIHAD NAMMOUR
SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON: RESILIENCE AMIDST SECURITY MEASURES AND SAFETY CONCERNS

Jihad Nammour is the Academic Coordinator of the Arab Master in Democracy and Human Rights. He is lecturer at the Institute of Political Science at USJ. Legal theory and political sociology are his areas of study. He has recently done several researches related to migrations and refugees. He develops educational programs within several Lebanese NGOs.

AMMAR YOUNAS
SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON: RESILIENCE AMIDST SECURITY MEASURES AND SAFETY CONCERNS

Ammar Younas is enrolled in the Arab Master in Democracy and Human Rights at University of Saint Joseph Lebanon where he is also serving as Research Assistant. He holds degrees in Medicine, Finance, Law, and Political Marketing. Recently, he has graduated from the American University of Central Asia and Bard College of New York, with a dual degree in International and Comparative Politics. Before coming to Lebanon, Ammar has been teaching at Eastern University named after Mahmud Kashgari Barskani, Kyrgyzstan.
BACKGROUND AND STUDY OBJECTIVES

Lebanon, currently hosting the highest per capita ratio of refugees in the world, has been struggling with scarce resources and worries related to porous borders and security, coupled with a bitter memory from its experience with Palestinian refugees which led to the civil war in 1975. Lebanon is not party of the 1951 Convention and therefore offers limited legal protection for refugees and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Lebanon is bound by the principle of non-refoulement and by the obligations of the human rights treaties it has signed. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has allowed UNHCR to register refugees, which provides some legal protection and services, but does not give access to jobs or asylum.

Lebanon has no legislation related to Syrian refugees, but the Lebanese Council of Ministers adopted on 23 October of 2014 a brief policy paper concerning Syrian refugees qualified as “displaced”. This decision mentions social, economic and security dangers facing Lebanon, and posits three objectives: the reversal of the influx of Syrian nationals, the reinforcement of security measures, and the reinforcement of the law to protect Lebanese access to jobs. In December of 2014, the General security followed up on this policy paper, issuing a new set of requirements for entry and renewal of residential permits. Those requirements include a $200 renewal fee, a rent contract, a sponsorship by a Lebanese national, and a commitment not to work. Later on, in February of 2017, General Security issued a statement waiving the $200 residential permit renewal fee for all refugees registered with UNHCR before 2015. This decision is expected to improve refugee access to services, including schools and health, as well as registration of births and deaths. However, the implementation of this decision may be tenuous.

Policy decisions and shifts in Lebanon, mirror the debate with regards to the impact of legal status on refugee influx on one hand and its effects on the vulnerability of resident refugees, on the other. Policy makers around the world often assert that legal status and substantial conditions given to refugees such as right to work and access to services have a “pull” effect, thereby attracting more refugees in a country. In parallel, research does not provide definitive answers on this matter. Some studies show that the impact of legal status on livelihood is not clear as refugees can work in the informal sector where law enforcement is loose, while other studies show that legal status is a social exclusion mechanism, and that policies leading to limitation and control increase refugee vulnerability. In addition, research often refers to the negative impact that such policies may have on public opinion, thereby causing a rise in tensions.

The goal of this study is to measure the impact of the legal status policy on refugee vulnerability and to assess the extent of refugee resilience. We have measured refugee perception of security, mobility, access to services, and social integration in Lebanon. Moreover, we have measured the Lebanese host community’s perception of security and level of tolerance towards refugees in economic and social spheres. Our surveys also touch on media exposure and its impact on the Lebanese perception of refugees.

Two surveys were done in the summer of 2015 and 2016, at a 12-months interval. In order to measure the perception of both communities, surveys were done among both, Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host community. While the sample of Syrian refugees was devised in the light of the distribution of refugees reported by UNHCR, the sample of Lebanese respondents was computed proportionally to the refugees interviewed in every region allowing to measure interactive effects. Indicators can be measured in absolute terms, but also in relative terms by comparing refugees and hosts.

3. https://www pressreader com/lebanon/the-daily-star-lebanon/20170401/281590945406490
5. This report is a follow up report published in July 2015 entitled “Survey on Perception of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”
Refugees face many problems when dealing with administrative procedures. A detailed report published by UNHCR in 2015 shows that the complications related to the registration of refugees in Lebanon increase their vulnerability and is a major obstacle to accessing basic services such as health and education. Although the Lebanese authorities have waived the fee of 200$ as a requisite to get residency permits for those refugees who are registered with UNHCR, this measure excludes more than 500,000 refugees who are not registered with UNHCR. The 2017 Human Rights Watch report on Lebanon warns that the safety and security of refugees not registered with UNHCR, and Palestinian refugees coming from Syria, is highly compromised, thus effecting other registered refugees and the host Lebanese community.

Maja Janmyr (2016) stressed that the deeply precarious legal position is making the host community suspicious of refugees as well as leaving no choice for refugees besides leaving the country or accepting exploitation.

In relation to the precarity of the situation of refugees, a report by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and International Alert (2015) tackles Lebanese perceptions of security, affirming that the level of security among Lebanese people has considerably dropped since 2010. This feeling of insecurity is a mere existential one and not necessarily based on facts and personal experiences, according to the report which points towards media’s role in forging public perception.

Many think tanks like the Carnegie Middle East Center suggested that beside the legal procedures and Lebanese focus on other short-term responses, there is a need to think about increasing social and political cleavages and new forms of marginalization among Syrian and Lebanese communities. Lorenza and Griesse’s discussion paper published by the European Commission has highlighted that refugee legal status problems contributed to the expansion of unregulated activities, and harmed Lebanese employers, who are facing substantial labour shortages in key economic sectors such as construction and agriculture. The tensions between refugees and Lebanese is further fueled by the Media reporting crimes and portraying refugees as criminals. In recent months, certain videos have gone viral on social media painting a bad image of refugees and alleging that refugees violate law and order in the country. As a counter strategy, the Ministry of Information launched a media campaign which aims to initiate a constructive public debate over the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon through cooperation with news outlets, civil society activists, celebrities and social media influencers. This counter strategy shows the importance of careful reporting through formal or informal media on refugee issues to avoid increasing refugee vulnerability.

We posit the following hypotheses:

1. Lack of registration of refugees decreases their level of security and impacts their mobility and access to livelihoods, despite economic resilience.
2. Lack of registration of refugees may improve the perception of the host community with regards to security, but does not decrease actual levels of crime.
3. Lack of registration of refugees restricts social integration between the two communities.
4. Media reinforce this dynamic, impacting negatively the perception of the host community and further increasing refugee vulnerability.

References:

METHODOLOGY

Two surveys were done with a one-year interval, with similar sampling and questionnaires. The surveys were done in June of 2015 and August of 2016. They included a representative sample of Syrian refugees from all over Lebanon, and Lebanese residents living in the same towns as the interviewed refugees. The priority in the sampling was to draw a representative sample of refugees from all over Lebanon. Then, Lebanese respondents were interviewed in the same localities and proportionally to the number of refugees. It is important to note here that the Lebanese data was not meant to get a representative sample of the Lebanese population, but it was used to evaluate the mirroring effect taking place between refugee and host community perceptions.

The samples of refugees of both surveys were taken from UNHCR’s database. The UNHCR database included 1,756 localities with the number of registered Syrian refugees divided by gender and age group for each locality. The total number of refugees is 1,041,784 of which 486,154 are 18 years of age or older.

Thus 1,200 Syrian refugees aged 18 or over, or about one in 400 individuals were selected, in addition to a sample of 600 Lebanese residing in the same localities. In order to ensure a good representativeness, the drawing of the sample was done in two stages. In the first stage, a certain number of localities are drawn from the 1,756 localities of the database, giving each locality a probability to be selected proportionally to the number of refugees aged 18 years or more registered in this locality. In the second stage, a proportional number of individuals to be interviewed were chosen in each locality. This method ensures that each individual in the database has the same chance of being in the sample.

By convention, and in order not to disperse too much the field survey, the number of Syrian individuals to be interrogated in each locality was set at a minimum of 10. The number of localities to be visited were therefore limited to 120.

In every locality, respondents living in houses, shelters, or camps were selected proportionally to the numbers provided by UNHCR. Within households, respondents were selected randomly using the next birthday approach. As the survey covered a sensitive topic for Syrians who are not in their country and may fear to speak out, it was critical to include Lebanese and Syrian surveyors in the team. This allowed to later analyze the extent to which respondents overestimated their security level or restrained from reporting assaults and incidents.

The Syrian questionnaire was longer and more detailed than Lebanese questionnaire. It covered:

- Gender/Age/Region of origin/Occupation/etc.
- Registration with UNHCR/General Security
- Safety level
- Feelings towards authorities (Police, GS, Army, Municipality)
- Feelings towards UNHCR, NGOS
- Feelings towards Lebanese
- Exposure to threat/insult/assault/blackmailing + source + response
- Subject to Raid/Search/Arrest/Eviction/etc.
- Movement restriction
- Checkpoints/Curfews/Random checks and patrols
- Problems accessing services (Health, Education, Electricity, etc.)
- Friendships in Lebanon
- Similarities between the 2 cultures
- Feeling welcome
- Return to Syria

The Lebanese questionnaire attempted to mirror somehow the Syrian questionnaire, covering:

- Gender/Age/Region of origin/Occupation/etc.
- Safety level
- Positive/Negative impact from Syrian refugees
- Feelings towards Syrians: hatred/fear/respect/
- Compassion
- Interaction with Syrian refugees
- Exposure to threat/insult/assault/blackmailing + source + response
- Checkpoints/Curfews/Random checks and patrols
- Syrian impact on public services
- Syrian friendships
- Similarities between the 2 cultures
- Willingness to hire a Syrian refugee
- Willingness to have Syrian refugees in neighborhood
- Willingness to send kids to school with Syrian refugees
- Willingness to marry Syrian refugee
- Media impact on public opinion
BASIC WORRIES, UNHCR REGISTRATION, AND LEGAL STATUS

The survey started with an open question, asking respondents what is their main concern while living in Lebanon. The top worry mentioned by 350 respondents in 2015 was security. Then comes the economy, followed by legal papers, alienation, and lodging. In 2016, security remains the main concern of refugees followed by health and education. When asked about other worries, 33% of those who responded mentioned rent, work, and inflation. Clearly the needs for health, education, and revenue are rising among refugees.

In short, government policies had the effect of limiting refugee registration to almost one fifth of the refugee population. In addition, the number of refugees having legal papers has dropped by 9% within a year. The following sections will attempt to evaluate the impact of this situation on refugee security and livelihood.

In 2016, security remains the main concern of refugees followed by health and education.

UNHCR registration in both years has remained relatively high (79% in 2015 and 77% in 2016). However, the number of refugees with legal status was relatively low, and dropped from 30% in 2015 to 21% in 2016. Prospects did not look very positive as well, as in 2016, 48% of those who have legal residency said that it will expire in 1 to 3 months. The main reasons for not having legal residency in 2016 are financial (mentioned by 80% of respondents) and inability to find a sponsor (mentioned by 68% of respondents). In addition, the perception that lack of residency papers causes feeling of insecurity topped up from 88% in 2015 to 97% in 2016.

The number of refugees with legal status was relatively low, and dropped from 30% in 2015 to 21% in 2016.

In both surveys, current income is above $550 for those who live in Mount Lebanon and below $250 for those who live in the Bekaa, while the average income when they were in Syria was the same. This means that, while refugees settled across regions regardless of their revenue, income disparity started to appear in response to the job market where they settled. Those numbers reflect a deepening inequality among Syrian refugees since they settled in Lebanon.

Another breakdown of the revenue was done by type of housing. Refugees in camps or places below standards reported a significantly lower income than those living in shared apartments or shelters, while average income when they were in Syria was the same. This also reflects an increase of inequality cleavages among refugees.

To evaluate the impact of legal status on income, we further break down income by whether refugees have residence papers or not. The cross-tabulation produces some numbers showing that those who don’t have residence papers have lower income than those who do. Nevertheless, resilience has taken place through revenue increase for both refugees with and without legal papers.

Average family revenue has gone up from 350$ in 2015 to 422$ in 2016, although the percentage of Syrians working has not

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Income 2015</th>
<th>Average Income 2016</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t have residence papers</td>
<td>339$</td>
<td>377$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have residence papers</td>
<td>518$</td>
<td>589$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the mapping of work in Syria against work in Lebanon in 2016 shows many missed opportunities due to forced migration. 76% of unskilled workers who came from Syria, managed to find work in similar areas in Lebanon. However, farming skills are unused, as only 20% of those working in farming in Syria are doing the same in Lebanon. With regards to skilled workers, 59% found work with similar skills in Lebanon, and 23% reintegrated the job market as unskilled workers. As for students (of age 18 and above), they have not been able to pursue their education (only 9% did). Finally, only 28% of those who had their own business in Syria, are doing the same in Lebanon.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESILIENCE

EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

The surveys show resilience among refugees with regards to income and access to services. Indeed, average family revenue has gone up from 350$ in 2015 to 422$ in 2016, although the percentage of Syrians working has not changed: 62% in 2015 against 61% in 2016.
SOCIAL RELATIONS

Refugee resilience did not have any major impact on social relations between refugees and the Lebanese host community. Indeed, in both surveys, almost two thirds of the refugee population do not feel welcome in the country (62% don’t feel welcome in 2015 and 63% in 2016). In parallel, the percentage of Lebanese who consider their relationship with refugees to be good or very good has not undergone any significant change (25% in 2015 and 27% in 2015). The willingness to hire refugees has undergone a small but barely significant increase, from 41% to 45%.

The Lebanese community is more willing to engage in economic than social relation with refugees. While 59% of Lebanese respondents would hire a Syrian refugee and 55% would accept refugees in their neighborhood, 43% would accept to send their kids to school with refugees and 22% would allow their child to marry a Syrian refugee. Tolerance levels are higher in the Bekaa and in the North.

Media and storytelling may have had an impact on social relations. 40% of Lebanese respondents said that they heard a lot of stories expressing hate against Syrian refugees. Most stories were heard in the street, among neighbors, and in the media (mainly TV). 29% of Lebanese respondents think that media has a strong impact on the perception of refugees, and 48% think that the impact is partial. More than two thirds said that humanitarian stories about refugees affect them, and more than two thirds also acknowledged that discussions in the media trigger reactions against refugees, and that media reports negative stories about refugees.

The Lebanese community is more willing to engage in economic than social relation with refugees.
REFUGEE SECURITY AND VULNERABILITY

SYRIAN RESPONDENTS

The questionnaire asked Syrian respondents whether any member of their family has been subject to any aggressive behavior such as beating, extortion, insult, or verbal threats. Statistics show that total numbers of such acts reported by refugees have increased over time, from 293 in 2015 to 365 cases in 2016. More than 80% of these blamed Lebanese offenders in both years. The regional breakdown shows that aggressive behavior increased in the Bekaa more than other regions. Breaking down reports of aggressive behavior by legal status, the data shows a big difference between those who are legally registered, and those who are not. Those who are registered, reported less cases of aggressive behavior (20%) than those who are not registered (35%).

We further asked respondents whether any member of their family has ever been subject to any of the following assaults by authorities or civilians: raids, insults, harassment, beating, blackmailing, extortion, arrest/detention, or eviction. In 2015, 43% of Syrian refugees reported incidents with authorities or civilians. In 2016, 50% of Syrian Refugees reported incidents with authorities or civilians. Civilians were mainly involved in harassment, insults, beating, eviction, and extortion, while authorities were further involved in raids and arrests. When asked what they did about it, 72% said that they did nothing about it. This high-level passivity is not surprising, knowing that 70% of the Syrian refugees do not have their official papers and that, if they attempt to report to police stations, they are likely to be arrested and detained for being illegal residents.

In 2016, 50% of Syrian Refugees have reported assaults. When asked what they did about it, 72% said that they did nothing about it.

LEBANESE RESPONDENTS

While refugees reported an increase in different kinds of assaults, Lebanese respondents reported a drop in the same type of behavior. In 2015, 13% of Lebanese respondents reported assaults, while in 2016, 8% reported assaults. The number of Lebanese respondents saying that they heard further stories about assaults also dropped from 17% in 2015 to 6% in 2016.

In 2016, 8% of Lebanese respondents reported assaults.

So the level of security has gone in opposite directions among Syrian and Lebanese communities. While on the Syrian side, economic resilience is coupled with a drop in the level of security due to absence of legal papers, on the Lebanese side, the feeling of security has increased.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS TO SERVICES

One of the fundamental rights of individuals is their freedom of movement which ensures the access to other fundamental rights. Every other right seems to be compromised if freedom of movement is not secured. Comparison of 2015 and 2016 surveys shows that there is no noticeable change in difficulty to move around reported by refugees. However, more refugees realize that this is due to checkpoints (34% in 2016 as compared to 18% in 2015).

Checkpoints are an important factor in Syrian refugees’ lives. When asked whether they have increasing problems with checkpoints, 37% of the
When asked if they have problems with checkpoints, 37% of the respondents said “yes” in 2015 and 58% in 2016. In addition, those who do not have legal papers reported more problems with checkpoints than those who do. One more interesting thing is that this increase in reported problems with checkpoints, is not linked to a decrease in freedom of movement. This reflects a kind of resilience among refugees who are finding ways around their mobility problems despite the perceived risk.

The 2015 survey showed that 71% of Syrian refugees considered checkpoints to be important to them, and 46% said that the main reason is to go to work, while 9% mentioned the need to have access to services. In 2016, 56% of them said that the main reason is to go to work, while 23% mentioned access to services, and 6% mentioned access to aid.

Finally, 45% of refugees had problems accessing services in 2015 and 29% in 2016. Access to services became more important and has improved despite the difficulties in movement which again reflects refugee resilience. Nevertheless, 37% said they were treated worse than others when accessing services in 2015 and 42% in 2016.

**STEPWISE REGRESSION AND REFUGEE SAFETY**

The survey shows that security agencies have lower approval scores among refugees who do not have legal residency. It further shows that those who have residency papers are less likely to get assaulted, to have checkpoint problems, or difficulties accessing services. Using combined data from the two surveys (2015 and 2016), we test a comprehensive model with a stepwise regression against the dependent variable “safety”. It turns out that checkpoint problems, limited mobility, bad relationship with authorities, assault, and difficulty to access services have a significant negative impact on refugee safety. These variables were either coded on a 4 or 5 points scale (depending on the number of answers), or coded as binary dummy variables.

They turned out significant for both years, 2015 and 2016, (“Year” dummy variable not significant).

In short, as seen in previous sections, while there has been refugee resilience with regards to access to jobs and income levels as well as access to services, legal status still posits a problem by reducing mobility and increasing vulnerability to assaults. The stepwise regression indicates that checkpoint problems, limited mobility, the resulting bad relationship with local authorities, problems accessing services, and assaults cause a decrease in safety levels.

**Regression Statistics**

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<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
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<table>
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<td>Year</td>
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RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

We have added questions related to resettlement in 2016. Approximately all Syrian refugees, that is 96%, said that they want to go back to their country if the situation becomes normal. 81% said that they will go back to the place of their origin, whereas 13% said that they do not know where they will go when they return to Syria. In response to the question, “What is required so that you consider returning to Syria?” Security was the main concern and motivational factor. In response to resettlement as an option, the majority preferred to go to Canada.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study evaluates the feelings of safety and security among Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities. The data shows that safety and security are the main concerns over time on both sides, that Syrian refugees are trapped in a situation where they cannot renew their registration, have limited mobility, are subject to assault, and yet have to survive in order to work, sustain themselves, and maybe try to get legal papers if they can satisfy the stringent conditions. The statistical output from this study can be divided into sub groups.

Registration: In short, government policies have limited access to legal papers to almost one fifth of the refugees. In fact, the number of refugees having legal papers has dropped by 9% of total refugees within a year.

Economic and Social Integration: There is an economic resilience among refugees reflected by the increase of their average income between 2015 and 2016 despite legal status. Nevertheless, there is deepening inequality, and refugee who do not have legal status have lower income. In addition, legal status has facilitated the integration in Lebanon of Syrian students, skilled workers, and business owners, while farmers who have legal papers are more likely to take other jobs, like out of office employment. In other words, refugee resilience has taken place in strong sectors of the society, but not in areas that need government support such as agriculture.

Refugee resilience did not have any major impact of social relations between refugees and the Lebanese host community. Many refugees do not feel welcome, and the host community would connect with refugees economically only.

Security: The level of security has gone in the opposite direction among Syrian and Lebanese communities. While on the Syrian side, resilience is coupled with a drop in the level of security due to the absence of legal papers, on the Lebanese side, the feeling of security has increased.

Mobility: Refugees reported an increase in problems with checkpoints, which is not linked to a decrease in freedom of movement. This reflects a kind of resilience among refugees who are finding workarounds to mobility problems despite the perceived risk. In addition, access to service has improved despite difficulties in movement which reflects refugee resilience again. Nevertheless, there is an increase in refugee complaints about unfair treatment when accessing services.

Return and Resettlement: 96% of Syrian refugees said they will go back to Syria if things go back to normal. Security and safety are a key requirement for return to Syria.

In a country where resources are low and security is precarious, reconciling refugee safety and vulnerability needs infrastructural changes to
accommodate the two. Refugees are showing resilience and adaptability, but their situation is not sustainable. In fact, refugees are perpetuating Lebanese job market imbalances, regional inequalities, social weaknesses, and security fears. In the meantime, Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese society are likely to react by increasing control and limitations in order to curb immediate risks. The solution to this problem has to be holistic and tied to the resolution of some of the fundamental weaknesses in the country.

The international community may be putting pressure towards further tolerance and measures to reduce refugee vulnerability, but it cannot ignore longer term infrastructural and strategic changes that address the weaknesses of public services and the economic system; allowing it to absorb refugee problems while addressing Lebanese fears. The Lebanon crisis response plan (https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_2020_LCRP_ENG-1.pdf) for 2017-2020 lists four strategic objectives: to ensure protection of vulnerable populations, to provide immediate assistance to vulnerable populations, to support service provision through national systems, and to reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social and environmental vulnerability. The fourth strategic objective is a sine qua non condition to the sustainability of the other three, and it can only be reached through fundamental changes, including better governance. Otherwise, long term drifts will curb resilience, which is ephemeral.

While the longer-term strategic goal to reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, and environmental vulnerability has yet to be defined, developed and implemented, refugee resilience and safety are tenuous. The long awaited parliamentary elections can enflame the debate and cause the discourse to shift towards short term measures to conquer public opinion. The challenge is to keep the longer-term objectives in sight and not let shorter term interests triumph.

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EXPLOITATION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES THROUGH THE SPONSORSHIP SYSTEM: CASES OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE BEQAA AND BEIRUT

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BACKGROUND

Before the crisis began in Syria, Syrians arriving in Lebanon were granted an “Arrival Visa” for a stay of six months, extendable to another six months upon request and free of charge. However, as the Syrian refugee crisis worsened in 2014, and in response to the massive flow of refugees entering into the country, the Lebanese authorities started to develop methods to monitor, control and systemize the entry of Syrian nationals.

In the early stages of Syrian displacement in fact, Lebanon adopted an overall open border and “non-encampment” policy. However, in October 2014 a new policy on Syrian displacement was adopted aiming at reducing access to the country and encouraging return to Syria. Therefore, through the issuance of a new set of entry requirements for Syrians and new rules for Syrian nationals already in Lebanon applying for or renewing residency permits, Syrians have been increasingly pushed into the sponsorship or Kafala system and have consequently suffered enhanced exploitation and abuse.

METHODOLOGY

A literature review of available work has been supported by a series of interviews conducted with 15 Syrian refugees, who have a sponsor or who have been sponsored at some point, between 15 and 60 years of age, and residing in the region of the Beqaa and in Beirut. We have further based this research on previous interviews with NGOs and International Organizations as well as examples and case studies. The qualitative research in the first phase has been useful for the assessment of the exploitative nature of the sponsorship system in Lebanon while the interviews conducted with refugees and local NGOs or International Organizations have shown overall demonstration of frustration. The issue of sponsorship of Syrians is relatively new and sensitive and it has been challenging to gather information about this issue.

OBJECTIVE

The overall aim of this research is to analyze the effects of the sponsorship system on Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon. The main objective, however, is to prove that the sponsorship system is enhancing vulnerability and abuse towards Syrian refugees and that this structure does not serve legal status. In essence, the paper seeks to prove that the system of sponsorship reinforces the inequality between Syrians and kafeels and may encourage the exploitation of refugees.

Throughout the paper, we will refer to Syrians as “refugees” as stated in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees even though Lebanon did not ratify it and identifies them as “displaced persons”.

THE MECHANISM OF SPONSORSHIP SYSTEM

In 2011, at the outset of the Syrian conflict, many refugees fleeing violence and war took refuge in Lebanon. Its proximity to Syria, together with the country’s long history of work migration and open border policy, would soon make Lebanon one of the main destinations for Syrian refugees. Subsequently, in an attempt to limit the flow of refugees, the Lebanese government endorsed a policy shift which included increased border control measures and the establishment of stringent regulations regarding entry requirements and residency conditions.

Following the entry into force of the new regulations on January 5th, 2015, only a limited number of Syrians have been able to enter the country through legal channels. The new procedure involved the issuing of a short-term visa for Syrian nationals, allowing them to enter Lebanon under different categories: tourism, work visit, property owner, tenant, student, shopping, traveling to another country, medical visit, an appointment with a foreign embassy, and humanitarian entry. In case they do not fall within any of the above-mentioned categories, they are asked to provide a “pledge of responsibility” signed by a Lebanese national or registered entity, which means they need to secure themselves a sponsor.

When the Government of Lebanon (GoL) requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop registering those coming from Syria in April 2015, refugees found themselves forced to look for a sponsor as the only possibility to seek refuge in Lebanon. Starting from April 2015, both in the cases of “entry for work” and “entry not for work”, the applicant needed to provide a “pledge of responsibility” at the General Security Office (GSO) and pay a fee of 200 USD/per person above 15 years old for a 6 months residency permit. The sponsor needed to apply for a work permit from the Ministry of Labor in case requested.14

In addition to that, a series of documents should have been provided by the Syrian nationals (ID, previous entry cards, housing commitment signed by the landowner or tenant, lease agreement stamped by a Mukhtar, copy of ID document of the tenant, photos and copies of the above documents) whether they were previously registered with UNHCR or not.

However, the difficulty in collecting the required documents, the cost of the sponsor and the volatility of the whole sponsorship system, which is very much relegated to the informal level, created a challenging procedure that most Syrians were unable to follow. In an interview conducted with a staff member of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), I have been told that lately the organization has been detecting an increased pressure on Syrians to resort to sponsorship.

The main problem with pushing Syrians to secure a sponsor is the informal fee that they are asked to pay to the person in charge of their sponsorship. Fees can range from a minimum of 100 USD up to 1000 USD per person. The total cost of a legal permit renewal per individual, including the 200 USD fee, the expenses for the necessary documents and for the sponsor, ranges between 600 USD and 1400 USD, an amount that few can afford.15

A second issue identified by the NRC is the fact that many Syrians end up asking to be sponsored by their landlords or employers because not all of them have direct connections with the Lebanese people. Therefore, the risk is to be bound by a double subordinate relationship: if any trouble occurs between the two parts, Syrians are constrained on the legal level and on the housing/work side as well. The fact of being compelled to the same person for various aspects of refugee life allows for an increase in abuse and exploitative measures.

Having interviewed several groups of persons living in different camps in the Valley of the Beqaa, I have been told different stories of exploitation and abuse.16 H., a 22 years old man has paid nearly 500 USD “applying” for a sponsor that never showed up and who instead confiscated his documents through a third party (a wasit), preventing him to move freely within the country. A.S., a 50 years old man, wanted to find a different sponsor because his current one was abusive and aggressive but the only way he could accomplish that was by leaving the country and reapplying. A., a 46 years old man, has 5 children and a wife and cannot afford to pay the 200 USD fee for any of his family members and therefore lives illegally in the camp. As he told me, he is very worried about his oldest children, who will turn 15 soon and will have no possibility to work without a sponsor. R., a 39 years old man, has been living in Lebanon for 3 years without legal papers because he cannot afford to pay 200 USD. The last time he went to the GSO to ask for advice, he had his personal documents confiscated and has been told to retrieve them after the payment of the fee was made. The stories of Syrian victims of this system which involve not only the refugees and their kafeels but also administrative complications are endless.

As most refugee don't have legal status – due to the fact that most Syrians do not have access to legal documentation because they either cannot afford them or cannot return to their country to regularize their situation – authorities will not take into consideration their claims. This fact allows sponsors to discriminate and act arbitrarily. Refugees who are at constant risk of arrest and detention because of legal status typically hesitate in reporting abuse.

Reinforcing a sort of guest-host relation between the two parts, the system of sponsorship allows an increase of exploitative dynamics and worsens the social and legal situation of Syrians. As sponsorship arrangements need to be renewed on an annual basis, refugees continue to be vulnerable beyond the expiry of the initial sponsorship contract. When the sponsorship is terminated, so is the right to remain in the country17 and when Syrian refugees change sponsors, they need to leave the country before reapplying for a new sponsorship; the cheapest option is to return to Syria, which places them at risk.18

16. Interviews were conducted on April 9th 2017 with the support of Sawa for Development Organisation.
Syrians interviewed by various NGOs with whom I have cooperated state that they have not been able to renew their legal residency permits because the person who offered to sponsor them suddenly refused, without providing any valuable explanation. They have reported being often victims of exploitation from their sponsors, who confiscate their ID documents, promise to pay for their sponsorship paperwork and eventually fail to do so, or change their mind without providing any reason.\textsuperscript{19} Sponsors seem to take advantage of the condition of vulnerability faced by refugees and exploit them through all possible means. They exert considerable control over Syrians as withdrawal of sponsorship leaves them more vulnerable to abuse.

The adoption of the sponsorship system has been justified by the need to monitor the Syrian presence in the country and seems to be a response to security concerns. The Lebanese Government considers the number of Syrian refugees in the country to be a serious threat to security, political, economic, and social stability and has accordingly enacted laws and policies that treat Syrian refugees as undesirable foreigners. Even though there is no evidence that the sponsorship system has actually solved the security issue, the Kafala remains an exploitative system, which produces inequality and places the refugee in a vulnerable and subordinate position to the kafeel.

As a vicious cycle, the lack of legal residency permit causes lack of safety, limited movement and increasing economic limitations, which in turn prevent refugees from saving to pay for the legal residency permit.\textsuperscript{20} The results of the latest research carried out by the Lebanese Centre for Human Rights in 2016 shows that despite the regulations implemented in 2015, which require sponsorship for workers and the “pledge not to work” for refugees registered with UNHCR, the majority of Syrian refugees work irregularly.\textsuperscript{21} The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that only about 2000 Syrians residing in Lebanon are currently holding official work permits whereas 95% work completely illegally, mainly in the agricultural sector.\textsuperscript{22}

In this situation of extreme vulnerability, Lebanese sponsors gain the right to control the legal status of refugees and therefore, the capacity to exploit them. The affected refugees are left with two solutions: they either leave Lebanon, or accept exploitation.\textsuperscript{23} Human Rights Watch’s research specifically indicates that the sponsorship system increases Syrians exposure to harassment, exploitation and abuse, and facilitates corruption and therefore can be considered a modern “form of slavery”.\textsuperscript{24}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

The Kafala system applied to Syrian refugees is indeed an abusive system. The crucial point in our analysis was that the sponsorship system, establishing an exploitative relationship between Syrians and sponsors, reinforces their inequality. On the basis of security concerns, the adoption of the sponsorship system has been justified by the need to monitor the Syrian presence in the country. However, no evidence that this system has actually solved the issue has been given or found. It is therefore difficult to justify and exposes the Lebanese authorities to accusation of being complicit in the exploitation of refugees.

As Amnesty International affirmed, “all asylum-seekers and refugees from Syria are in extreme need of international protection [...]”.\textsuperscript{25} Neglecting the protection issue raises concerns about the extent to which the Lebanese Government is able to deal effectively with one of the largest refugee crisis in contemporary history.\textsuperscript{26} Regularizing the status of Syrian refugees and providing access to formal employment, are some of the first steps that Lebanon needs to tackle as a matter of urgency. We strongly believe in the necessity of abolishing the Kafala system for Syrian refugees. Moreover, a clear policy for formal entry and residency of Syrian refugees needs to be developed. The latest measures adopted by the Lebanese Government have only created more difficult procedures and resulted in refugees entering and residing in the country illegally. As the sponsorship system leaves many Syrian refugees in a deeply precarious position, it moreover enhances their vulnerability. Therefore, the risk to be exploited and abused increases. Considering the International Cooperation as an important tool of crisis resolution, more coordination and support between the state parties is needed in order to manage the crisis in a more efficient way.

\begin{itemize}
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\item \textsuperscript{20} HRW, “I just wanted to be treated like a person. How Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees”, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Interview with Tina Gewis, ICLA Specialist, Norwegian Refugee Council, Beirut, 3 May 2017.
\item \textsuperscript{23} N. Saghieh, “Manufacturing Vulnerability in Lebanon: Legal Policies as Efficient Tools of Discrimination”, Legal Agenda, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{25} HRW, “I just wanted to be treated like a person.”
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BACKGROUND

The spotlight on Europe's challenge to manage a ‘refugee crisis’ involving one million refugees and migrants often overshadows the fact that 86% of refugees are scattered in the global South (UNHCR, 2016). The vast presence of refugees in the global South, their diverse hosts and the varied humanitarian responses from state and non-state actors have been largely neglected and overlooked by academia. In turn, this neglect has arguably contributed to framing refugees as passive victims waiting for Northern donors to ‘save’ them, overlooking their agency. Acknowledging the varied humanitarian responses is thus undoubtedly fruitful, as they can inform the development of state or non-state policies and programs that provide support to displaced communities.

INTRODUCTION

To offer a broader representation of the nature of the Southern experiences of displacements from Syria, this paper will shed light on initiatives led by “established” Palestinian refugees from Shatila camp in Lebanon as hosts to “new” Syrian refugees in their camp—challenging the hypothesis that refugee host communities are comprised of settled citizens. As such, the study explores the question of refugee-refugee humanitarianism that has thus far been explored by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (in which she applied Derrida’s conceptualization of hospitality) in camps such as Baddawi, Burj el-Barajneh and Nahr el-Bared, through an extensional case-study of Shatila.

By conducting an exploratory study involving in-depth interviews with Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Shatila camp and UNRWA staff members, the research seeks to amplify our understanding of refugees' humanitarian responses to displacements and examine their own evaluations on the humanitarian programs in place. The paper will also study the sustainability of this form of refugee-refugee humanitarianism (Fiddan-Qasmiyeh, 2016) by considering Derrida’s philosophy of hospitality and the shift that may result from providing ‘welcome’ in the early phase to ‘hostility’ and ‘conditionality’ (Derrida, 2000). Consequently, the research will question, how can a welcoming community maintain solidarity and hospitality beyond the alleged shift? (Fiddan-Qasmiyeh, 2016). What are the outcomes of this symbiotic relationship between two vulnerable communities at the community level?

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN SHATILA REFUGEE CAMP

The 1948 exodus, also known as nakba, caused the displacement of over 750,000 Palestinian refugees to global and neighboring countries after the establishment of Israel (Pappe, 2006). As a result, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was founded to provide aid and relief for Palestine refugees who meet the definition of “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, 2016a).

Shatila camp, covering less than a square mile on the southern borders of Beirut, is one of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon that was established in 1949 for merely 3,000 people. Today, the camp occupies the same limited space, but with around 40,000 residents. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees have been historically marginalized, as they face critical socioeconomic, political and legal obstacles that limit their full enjoyment of a variety of human rights; with no right to own property, a strict access to specific professions and job opportunities, and restrictions in obtaining general public services other than those provided by UNRWA, including healthcare and education (UNHCR, 2016).

Whilst poverty, overcrowded shelters, and poor health conditions plague Shatila, the camp has become a refuge space for “new” displaced refugees from Syria since 2011. As a result, the population of Shatila increased to more than twice its populace figures (Mackenzie, 2016). Khaled Sarris, the former principal of the only school in Shatila explained that this phenomenon was facilitated by previous bonds and family relationships between Syrians, Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS) and Palestine refugees from Lebanon (PRL) living in Shatila—making it a practical ‘refuge space’ for those fleeing persecution and violence in Syria.
Refugee-led humanitarian responses to the “new” Syrian refugees that arrived at Shatila camp are largely undocumented and neglected in academia. Yet, such initiatives have offered key and evident forms of support, solidarity, and hospitality to the “new” refugees, in what Fiddan-Qasmiyeh (2016) refers to as ‘refugee-refugee humanitarianism’. In the absence of poverty, scarce resources and poor services, “established” Palestinian refugees have used formal and informal resources—including their homes, food, spaces, clothes, and mosques—to provide the “new” arrivals from Syria with material and nonmaterial support during the initial stages of their arrival to Shatila. Through informal networks, Palestinian refugees in Shatila hosted numerous Syrian families in their homes for months, providing them with physical and moral support. Mosques, as a formal channel, were also used as a site for housing the “new” refugees and to host days of solidarity with Syrians: where “established” Palestinian refugees would donate extra clothes, mattresses, blankets and other forms of resources available to support them.

Majdi Adam, a Palestinian social activist and the captain of Shatila’s Palestine Sports Club, has shared personal and invaluable examples of refugee-led initiatives to fill gaps left by the existing humanitarian programs and the distinction between UNRWA and the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As UNRWA’s services are restricted to Palestinians, PRS fall within their mandate; UNHCR, on the other hand, offers its services to those who meet the definition of a refugee according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which includes Syrians. This separation does not only produce a legal and social protection gap between Palestinian and Syrian refugees (Erakat, 2014) but also impacts the relationship and power imbalances between the “new” and “established” refugees within their refuge space.

Various “established” refugees in Shatila have reported witnessing Palestinian refugees from Syria desperately screaming in the aid centers for Syrians and asking provocatively, “We are refugees too – why is the aid only for Syrians? Why would you discriminate against us just because we are Palestinian?” When the “established” refugees in Shatila noticed the faults arising from the system in place, Majdi alleges that Palestinian refugees began using their own initiatives to combat this unreasonable separation, “We started our own initiatives while working with the NGOs that only help the Syrians. For example, we would register the Syrians alone on paper as required; but then at night, we would also provide the Syrian Palestinians with what they needed”.

Majdi stated that the “established” refugee community also found faults in how the limited resources are distributed and prioritized by the leading organizations. For instance, they provide every family with the same number of supplies, regardless of how many children they have. “Established” refugees that work with these organizations have used their own initiatives and responses in order to fill this gap, “For the families that had many children and did not have enough supplies from the organizations, we would also tell them to come back at night and we would furnish them with more blankets and resources to fulfill their needs”, Majdi explained.

While these distribution processes might lead to certain refugees being unable to access resources when items are being delivered ‘after hours’, such refugee-led initiatives display that refugee-refugee solidarity is capable of filling the gaps left by the limitations of the current humanitarian programs. This highly challenges the notion that refugees are passive victims in need of outside help and repositions the depiction of Palestinian refugees from dependent recipients to providers of support (Fiddan-Qasmiyeh, 2016). Most importantly, such experiences exhibit the refugees’ perspectives on the shortcomings of the humanitarian system that responds to their own displacement.

While interviewing the “established” Palestinian refugees in Shatila to examine their motives to support and welcome the new arrivals, all respondents provided the same reasoning. As one of the PRL working with UNRWA puts it, “As Palestinian refugees, we know how it feels to not have anywhere safe to go or not to be welcomed. This led a natural urge within us to help in any way that we can to reduce their suffering. Our human, ethical and national responsibility is to offer them with whatever we possibly can and to at least welcome them”. Hence, it may be argued that refugee-refugee solidarity is a bond that is enhanced by the overlapping experiences both refugee populations share on the nature and impact of forced displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). For PRS in particular, this connection is even stronger as they share the Palestinian identity and family acquaintances in the camp. Moreover, as a neighboring country to Lebanon and Palestine, Syrians share similar traditions, cultures, and language—facilitating the solidarity and the social integration between them.
However, it is important not to romanticize this form of refugee-refugee humanitarianism and consider the progression and sustainability of providing hospitality over a period of time. As Derrida’s notion of hospitality postulates, being welcoming is not static: over time, hospitality could become infested with hostility and conditionality due to power imbalances (Derrida, 2000). Since the Syrians’ arrival in Shatila six years ago, interviews with Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Shatila displayed a gradual development from hospitality to hostility and tension over time. As one of the Palestinian refugees stated, “Year after year, the situation between us has been changing. We now know that the Syrian conflict will take much longer to solve than we expected.” When asked, “How long did the established refugees initially expect the Syrians to stay?” Palestinian respondents stated that when they realized that the Syrian conflict will extend longer than a year, their relationship with the Syrians in the camp started to gradually change. Interviewees have described the growth of the increasing pressure while hosting “new” Syrian refugees over the last six years as ‘inevitable’, considering the shortage of resources and the poor living conditions from which the residents of the camp already suffer from.

According to UNRWA officials and refugees in Shatila, the tension was mostly felt in schools, jobs and access to healthcare. Since the schools have merged classes of PRL with PRS, the classes became overloaded; access to healthcare takes a significantly longer period than it used to; and the informal job sector has become more competitive. As a PRL in Shatila protested, “Syrians accept any job, and at lower prices than what we are used to. For someone like me, whose job is to paint walls, I take a salary of $40 per day, while a Syrian accepts $20”.

Yet, is this relationship necessarily inevitable or is it fueled by host-country legislations and isolated humanitarian programs that could be enriched by inter-agency collaboration and a development-oriented approach? Unlike refugees under the mandate of UNHCR, Palestinian refugees under UNRWA endure an unequal protection, aid and a legal regime—which, as Erakat (2014) argues, contradicts the intent of the 1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR Statute, which rationalizes inter-agency cooperation.

As UNRWA has been forced to apply austerity measures during the last few years due to lack of funds, a decline in services has been palpable to the refugees under its mandate. In fact, UNRWA’s average annual spending per refugee has dropped from about $200 in 1975 to around $110 today (UNRWA, 2017). Moreover, while UNHCR seeks durable solutions for the registered Syrian refugees, such as the chance to resettle in other countries, UNRWA does not offer equivalent advantages to PRS or Palestinian refugees due to a postulation that this may relinquish their right of return (Su, 2014). On the other hand, since Lebanese labor law forbids PRL to work in 36 liberal or syndicated occupations (including medicine, farming and public transportation) (UNHCR, 2016) and due to the limited legal status of Syrians in Lebanon, both refugee populations are enforced to compete in informal sectors. In effect, the policies and international regimes in place largely contribute to the negative impacts refugees have felt in a limited, overcrowded and under-resourced space—hindering the sustainability of refugee-refugee humanitarianism.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that positive impacts were also felt by some refugees. When “established” Palestinian refugees were asked if their social life changed after and before the “new” refugees have arrived, they all shared an optimistic response. For Majdi, the Syrians’ arrival provided him with the incentive to become socially active, “Their arrival has made us remember our own displacement as Palestinian refugees. This motivated me to provide double the energy that I had for social work. Since I am the captain of Shatila’s Palestine Sports Club, we started welcoming and encouraging Syrian and Syrian Palestinians to join the club to help them forget their sufferings and integrate with the community”.

Meanwhile, when two Syrian refugees were asked to reflect on the change in their life since arriving at Shatila, they stated, “When we first arrived here, we felt very uncomfortable and shy, just like strangers – so we always preferred to hang out with Syrians alone. But today, we feel like we have integrated into the camp and the work life. Nowadays, if you walk on the streets, you will not notice a difference between a Syrian and a Palestinian in the camp”.


CONCLUDING REMARKS

The refugee-led initiatives by “established” Palestinian refugees in Shatila in response to the arrival of “new” Syrian refugees in the camp have exhibited fundamental forms of refugee-refugee solidarity; positioning refugees as hosts and sources of support with the capability to fill material and emotional gaps. However, this form of ‘alternative’ humanitarianism should not be idealized. After six years of the displacement of Syrians in Shatila, the hospitality that was initially offered by the Palestinian refugees has started to deteriorate, as the established refugees have reprioritized their own immediate needs after a lengthy period of time. Considering the absence of resources, physical space and rights that the refugees endure in their daily lives in Shatila, the shift from ‘hospitality’ to ‘hostility’ may be perceived as inevitable. Nonetheless, this generalization does not do justice to the key reasons that hinder refugee-refugee solidarity, which are largely driven by unjust governmental policies coupled with an imbalanced humanitarian program that offers differentiated treatments between Syrian and Palestinian refugees based on their nationalities. Therefore, in order to build development-based approaches that could sustain refugee-refugee humanitarianism and limit the marginalization of the established Palestinian refugees, it is important to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the current programs by taking into consideration the refugees’ own perspectives and entitling them as stakeholders in their own futures.

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BACKGROUND

This paper is an effort to analyze the vulnerability of the Syrian refugee women and to investigate factors that increase their vulnerability to sex trafficking in Lebanon through an intersectional approach. A vulnerability test has been applied to explain the personal, social and legal elements involved in the equation answering the following question: “Which are the personal and socio-economic elements that make Syrian refugee women vulnerable in Lebanon? How do they increase the vulnerability? And is there a relation between the vulnerability and the human trafficking for sexual exploitation?”

METHODOLOGY AND DISCUSSION

An explanation of vulnerability has been introduced by Uribe and Gonzalez27. They have developed a general scheme of analysis for the comprehension of vulnerability that has been used in our analysis. Vulnerability comes in a double standard based on endogenous and exogenous features. First, the endogenous, refers to the “Personal” vulnerability, intrinsically related to the biological and human elements of the person such as being children, elders, women (under certain context) and people with disabilities. The second category, “Exogenous” vulnerability, is further divided into typical and atypical vulnerability. The typical vulnerability is related to the social and economic features of the person and the atypical vulnerability is caused by the legal inequalities. These parameters have been used to describe the vulnerability of women refugees from Syria and determine the existence of an intersectional vulnerability.

PERSONAL VULNERABILITY

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) defines the discrimination against women as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex, intended to nullify the enjoyment of rights28. Violence might be “directed against a woman because she is a woman or may affect women disproportionately”29, and there are some personal, biological and gender-based characteristics, that make women more vulnerable due to generic physical fragility30. That is one of the reasons why, in situations of armed conflicts and forced migration, women suffer certain kinds of treatment such as torture, selective murder, and sexual violence, more than men do31.

The UN started to tackle the issue of women and refugees after 1985 in the annual Executive Committee of UNHCR32, and for the first time, in 1993, the Executive Committee Conclusion 73 described the existence of a link between sexual violence against refugee women and coerced displacement33.

The Inter-American Court on Human Rights (hereinafter IACHR) has established in cases of violence against women, that a special attention has to be given to the context in which violence is committed34, such as the case Gonzalez and others (cotton fields) vs Mexico, where the court has analyzed the context under which crimes committed against women corresponded to a systematic conduct of discrimination and a “cultural inferiority” of women in the society35. In Lebanon, according to Hayat Mirshad, inequalities between women and men in the country “…come from the tradition and culture of gender norms and conceptions, raising children with this pattern. This conception is represented in any part of the society like for

28. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Article 1
32. Ibid. p. 22
33. Ibid.
35. Ibid.132.
example in jobs... and also in the political system." In the same spirit, Roula Masri states that there are common practices of violence against women such as domestic violence, sexual harassment and early marriage that are normalized and are part of the culture.

These cultural perceptions and common practices have evidently affected Syrian refugee women settled in Lebanon since 2011. Thus, in 2012 the International Rescue Committee in collaboration with ABAAD published a report where the women interviewed stated that rape and sexual violence were the most common practices suffered by girls and women while they were in Syria and also once they had settled in Lebanon. When asked about the situation of the Syrian women refugee, Roula Masri from ABAAD added that “In 2016, 75 women were rescued from the mafia; all of them were Syrian, they are more vulnerable to such practices and more vulnerable to be harassed and suffer sexual violence, which takes place in camps, for example.”

The particular situation of Syrian refugee women has to be analyzed through the following fact: they have fled from Syria to Lebanon escaping from an armed conflict and several reports demonstrate that Syrian refugee women have been subject to several kinds of sexual and gender-based violence. Other Syrian refugee women have been also victims of the “survival sex” due to the economic situation and the lack of budget to afford a decent living standard of life.

**TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL VULNERABILITY**

Lebanon has not ratified the Convention Related to the Status of Refugees nor the Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees, however, the government agreed with UNHCR to register the refugees fleeing into Lebanon, but this registration stopped in 2015. Many people fleeing to Lebanon after 2015 have no residency permit or legal status that allows them to work or to have access to justice.

The typical vulnerability addresses the endogenous social and economic factors surrounding a person that can determine the affection to their living conditions and place them in a disadvantaged situation compared to the rest of the population. This kind of vulnerability is reinforced by the atypical vulnerability, namely, inequality before the law.

The IACHR has established that vulnerability corresponds to the personal conditions (described above) and the specific situation, identifying migrants as a vulnerable group due to their socio-economic situation when fleeing abroad. The socio-economic situation faced by refugees is comparable to the migrant experience when fleeing abroad, in terms of socio-economic inequalities. There is evidence that more than 50% of the Syrian households obtained an average income of 422 USD in 2016, standing below the Survival Minimum Expend Basket (SMEB), but representing an upgrade compared to the year 2015, when it was around 350 USD. It is still a very low income for the households considering the cost of living in Lebanon and the number of dependents that they usually have. The households, who are mostly women, face a very harsh economic situation and have to accept any kind of illegal jobs, "survival sex" amongst them, in order to support their children. On the other hand, only 79% of the refugees are registered with UNHCR, whereas only 30% have obtained legal residency papers. The lack of residency permits clearly affects the condition of the refugees as they are not able to secure any kind of legal jobs.

36. Hayat Mirshad, Head of Female, Interviewed on 30th of March 2017 at the Lebanese Women Democratic Gathering Headquarters, Furn el-Chebak, Beirut, Lebanon.
37. Roula Masri, Head of the department of gender equality of ABAAD, Interviewed on 5th of May 2017, ABAAD Headquarters, Furn el-Chebak, Beirut, Lebanon.
40. ICMPD, Targeting Vulnerabilities: The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons - A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Vienna: ICMPD, 2015, p.139
43. Case Masacres of Pueblo Bello v. Colombia [2006] (Inter-American Court of Human Rights), Paragraph 111.
44. Advisory Opinion Juridical conditions and rights of undocumented migrants 18/03 [2003] (Inter-American Court of Human Rights), Paragraph 112.
45. C. Alsharabati and J. Nammour, Survey on perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Between Resilience and Vulnerability, University Saint Joseph Political Science Institute, 2017, p. 12/64
48. Ibid. page 18/64
Regarding atypical vulnerability, caused by the inequality before the law, a study highlighted that the lack of residency permit is an obstacle for the enjoyment of the access to work, healthcare and education. It has also exposed the refugees to the fear of being deported to Syria or being arrested by Lebanese authorities. Therein, 91% of the refugees consider that the legal status has an impact on their perception of safety\(^{49}\). In 2016, around 50% of the Syrian refugees suffered a kind of abuse (harassment, evictions, raids, insults, among others)\(^{50}\), but 72% of them did not notify the authorities\(^{51}\). This exposes the lack of access to justice that results from the fear that notifying the authorities would result in detention or deportation. Therefore, the abuses and the lack of access to justice has represented a threat to the Syrian refugees and it has a disproportionate effect on women who are targeted based on gender reasons.

**INTERSECTIONALITY**

According to Patricia Collins, “the term intersectionality references the critical insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate, not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructing phenomena”\(^{52}\). Thus, intersectionality defines the cases of discrimination for multiple factors that interact simultaneously and creates a specific form of discrimination\(^{53}\), meaning that individuals who are subject to several forms of discrimination, such as migrant women, do not live the discriminatory experience in a fragmented way\(^{54}\). The intersectionality has been included also in some regional treaties\(^{55}\), such as the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention Belem do Para), which describes in Article 9 certain conditions that increase the vulnerability of women, such as the status of migrants, refugees or displaced persons\(^{56}\).

For example, in cases of indigenous women and girls such as Ines Fernandez Ortega vs Mexico and Rosendo Cantu vs Mexico, the ICHR described that discrimination for the reason of gender and ethnicity has consequences on equal access to justice and health care, and it affects the indigenous women and girls in a disproportionate way\(^{57}\). Also, in the case of women migrants, the intersection of several elements such as gender, migration, legal status, age and nationality creates an interdependency of factors that increases the risk that women suffer sexual violence\(^{58}\).

The discrimination suffered by Syrian refugees begins because of the conditions of refugees in Lebanon, where they do not find proper livelihood conditions and face several social and economic inequalities compared to the rest of the society. Since the refugee crisis of 2011, every refugee is in a delicate situation; however, women refugees experience a different level of vulnerability due the element of gender, described above as personal vulnerability. Therefore, the conditions of refugee and women cannot be separated from the analysis and have to be understood as multiple and inseparable factors that have an impact on the daily lives of refugee women.

**HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

Some international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Center for Migration Policy Development, and at the national level the NGO KAFA, have constantly reported the increase of sex trafficking since the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011. Colonel Haddad, head of the Human Trafficking Department of the ISF, kindly provided us with some relevant data about the number of victims and detainees from cases of human trafficking. In 2015, the number of victims of human trafficking were up to nineteen, the Syrian nationality being the first category of victims with a total of twelve out of nineteen. In 2016, the number of victims scaled up to eighty-seven, with eighty-two being of Syrian nationality\(^{59}\). The explanation of the increase of the number of victims in the database was because of the dismantlement of the criminal organization in Jounieh, in the brothel Chez Maurice, where seventy-five Syrian women were rescued by the authorities.

49. Ibid. page 19/64
50. Ibid. page 24/64
51. Ibid page 24/64
53. F. Rey, La Discriminación Múltiple, una realidad antigua, un concepto nuevo, Revista española de Derechos Constitucional, año 28, no. 84, Madrid, 2008, p. 264.
54. Case Raja Jawad, by his Litigation Guardian, Mohammad Irshad and others v. Her Majesty the Queen [2001] (Court of Appeal for Ontario), Court File no. C31680 paragraph.43.
55. A. Zota-Bernal, Incoporación del análisis interseccional en las sentencias de la Corte IDH sobre grupos vulnerables, su articulación con la interdependencia e indivisibilidad de los derechos humanos, Eunomia Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, No. 9, 2015, p. 74
57. Zota-Bernal Op.Cit, p. 74
58. Ibid.
59. Johnnie Haddad, Head of the Human Trafficking Department ISF, Interviewed on the 10th of April 2017, Human Trafficking Department of ISF, Hamra, Beirut, Lebanon.
There are two laws that have entered into contradiction in the legal framework. From one side, the law of 2011 about human trafficking regards the women as victims and only criminalizes the trafficker who is the perpetrator of the crime of trafficking for sexual exploitation. There is also a criminalization of prostitution in the criminal code which is going to sanction the woman and the corrupter but not the client, being a perpetrator of the crime along with the "pimp". Colonel Johnnie Haddad explained that the application of both laws has been a challenge for the police as there is a big margin of discretion of the authorities when considering a woman as a victim or as a perpetrator. This difference is going to be a key element for tackling the issue of sex trafficking, as, in our opinion, women should be presumed as victims of trafficking when caught practicing prostitution, with a female centered policy considering the fact that they have been historically victims of sex trafficking.

CONCLUSIONS

The indicators mentioned in the vulnerability tests demonstrate that the Syrian refugee women are suffering a multiplicity of vulnerabilities that increase the probability to be subject of gender-based violence notably sexual violence as a result of sex trafficking. First of all, it is because of the personal condition of the women, namely the fact that they have a physical fragility and a disadvantaged position in the society based on gender, in combination with the contextual gender violence previously experienced, making them more likely to suffer the impact of the organized crime and human trafficking for sexual exploitation in a disproportionate way comparatively to men.

Because of the lack of a proper legal status, their socio-economic condition falls below the poverty index. One of the reasons being that they are less likely to have access to jobs and education, and it pushes them to look for alternate illegal ways to earn money and therefore be targeted by the organized crime that would take advantage of the situation in order to exploit them sexually.

The intersectionality is an element that needs to be considered by the authorities when tackling the issues related to Syrian refugee women, because they face problems for both reasons: gender and migration status. They are further treated with inequality in the particular legal context, namely, laws targeting prostitution and human trafficking. Moreover, the Syrian women weakened position – due to the fact that their access to justice is restricted due to difficulties in acquiring legal status – is not taken into consideration. The new policies to be taken should be female centered and also take into account the refugee conditions, according to the international treaties ratified by Lebanon. Even though Lebanon is not signatory to international conventions regarding refugees, it is obligated by the rest of the international legal framework to adopt positive measures that guarantee the enjoyment of the economic, social, civil and political rights based on the principle of non-discrimination.

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60. Ibid.
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Article 1

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ASSESSING UNHCR’S RESETTLEMENT PRACTICE: UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

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BACKGROUND

UNHCR reports that Lebanon is currently hosting almost 1.1 million Syrian refugees\(^1\). Though not all Syrian refugees in Lebanon (SRL) are eligible, resettlement with UNHCR remains one of the few legal channels still available to rebuild a dignified life abroad. This research sheds light on UNHCR’s resettlement practice in Lebanon by assessing the resettlement knowledge of SRL and identifying their expectations. For the purpose of this analysis, the term expectations will be understood as “how the present and the future are framed based on past experiences, perceptions, emotions, imagination and desires – sometimes without a rational basis and with little available information”\(^2\); as for resettlement, it refers to “the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status”\(^3\).

METHODOLOGY

From 1 April to 30 April 2017, quantitative data collection was carried out through a standard questionnaire with a total of 291 SRL. In order to obtain the most accurate and reliable data possible, both tented settlements refugees from the Bekaa Valley (Al Dalhamia, Bar Elias, Taanayel, Haouch Al Harimi) and urban refugees from Beirut (Baajour Centre, Haret Hreik Centre, Ras Al Nabaa) were targeted. Access to refugees was facilitated by several NGOs, including Sawa for Aid and Development, Salam LADC and Amel Association International.

RESETTLEMENT KNOWLEDGE

In an attempt to examine whether UNHCR qualifies as an efficient outreach institution, attention will be focused on the impact of current communication strategies on resettlement awareness and understanding.

Resettlement awareness was deemed high among Syrian communities given that more than 80 % of surveyed refugees claimed they had heard about the possibility of being resettled. Results show that registration with UNHCR is of utmost importance: 84.6 % of registered refugees were aware of the existence of a resettlement programme compared to only 68.5 % of their non-registered peers. Notably, refugees residing in tented settlements were on average more aware than urban refugees. Nonetheless, only 10.2 % of surveyed refugees declared that they had been informed about the programme by UNHCR’s field staff. Friends (45.2 %) and the Internet, especially social media (35.7 %), appeared to be the main sources of information. A number of refugees also mentioned having been told about the programme by an NGO. For instance, in the Bekaa Valley, refugees living in tented settlements managed by SAWA for Aid and Development recalled that SAWA’s staff had regularly conducted information sessions centred around resettlement opportunities. This suggests that non-governmental actors play a significant role as intermediaries between refugees and UNHCR.

SRL’s level of understanding of UNHCR’s programme is crucial. In its Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR indeed stresses that “an effective communication outreach programme is a key part of managing expectations”\(^4\). Evidence shows that expectations tend to be amplified by rumours in communities, misunderstandings and a lack of information. In view of the results, it is evident that SRL lack basic understanding of resettlement. For instance, under the current scheme, only refugees satisfying UNHCR’s criteria can be resettled and selected candidates are not able to choose their host country. Yet, 52.4 % of respondents affirmed that they did not know who qualified for resettlement while 20.7 % believed that any refugee could be resettled. Also, 33.3 % of respondents were unsure as to whether they could choose their destination country while 45 % of them were convinced that they were allowed to personally select it. As they are often under-informed or misinformed, refugees develop a set of biased expectations. More emphasis should therefore be put on improving UNHCR’s communication strategies in connection with resettlement for the agency to increase its efficiency as an outreach actor.

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\(^3\) UNHCR. “UNHCR Resettlement Handbook” (2011): 9

63. UNHCR. “UNHCR Resettlement Handbook” (2011): 9
Expectations are “powerful in that they can motivate refugees to do well if they are set high, and also cause disappointment and grief if they are not met”66. Findings show that SRL expect to fulfill different types of expectations through resettlement. SRL highlighted wishes to enjoy three specific rights once resettled: the right to security of person (33.2%), the right to education (19.2%) and the right to work (13%). Numerous Syrians saw resettlement as a solution to end restrictions directly linked to their legal situation in Lebanon. For instance, issues such as the impossibility to be granted refugee status, the difficulty to obtain a residency permit or register children at birth, the requirement to have a sponsor and the lack of freedom of movement were mentioned.

“..."I want safety, no fear of hunger and a future for my children. I want to get away from problems and wars. I dream of settling down and having a peaceful life." Answers also conveyed the idea that the lack of integration of SRL was a direct consequence of discrimination.

“I want security, a decent life and a better situation for my children and my family. I would also like us to stop living as victims of racism in Lebanon; I would like to find security, work, dignity and equality in another country and get rid of this system of privilege.”

“I want to have human rights because we do not have any when we live in Lebanon. Lebanese people are racist against Syrians, maybe because of the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon in the past." In addition to this, a high percentage of SRL made explicit references to the concept of human dignity. For example, 33.2% of respondents referred to notions such as "humanity", "human being", "human rights", "respect", "dignity" "freedom" and "decency". “I want security, education and the feeling of being a human being who is capable of developing his or her community.”

“I want respect for each person as they are human beings and have the right to live in dignity and freedom."
THE CANADIAN EXAMPLE

The reasons behind the attractiveness of a country lie in its potential to fulfill refugees’ expectations. For SRL, the presence of friends and relatives was the leading factor in the choice of a resettlement country: many stated that they would not go to a country where they did not know anyone. Other factors such as compliance with human rights, religious freedom, multiculturalism, language, education, safety, healthcare and willingness to help Syrians were also highly valued by SRL.

With 112 mentions, Canada was the most popular destination country among surveyed SRL. The country ranked first as it seemed to offer a perfect combination of the aforementioned factors. De facto, SRL described Canada as being “a country governed by the rule of law and that respects religious and cultural diversity”. It was also said to be “democratic”, “free”, “peaceful” and “not racist”; it was called a “nation that respects human rights” and offers Syrians a chance to “live in dignity”. Interestingly, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s open-door policy towards Syrian refugees was also mentioned as an encouraging factor. The fact that Canada conducted large-scale resettlement activities in Lebanon influenced the perception of SRL; many explained that they had received positive feedback from relatives residing in the country. SRL were convinced that Canada offered “high living standards”, “quality education” and “good medical and psychological treatment”. One testimony read: “Canada: I am looking for safety and it is a wonderful country in terms of treatment and humanity. Here, in Lebanon, I do not feel that I am ever considered a man […] We are treated like the animals of the Lebanese forest, everyone is becoming hateful and people do not want us in their country. We became a bother, we became undesirable. I want to live proudly and I am tired of everything here.”

It can be deduced that a strong link exists between the image a country has among refugees and the willingness of the latter to be resettled in that country. Therefore, when trying to successfully expand their resettlement activities, states must, with the support of UNHCR, nurture their image so as to increase their visibility among refugee communities.

CONCLUSION

This research paper provided an analysis of UNHCR’s resettlement practice in the Lebanese context. Knowledge about resettlement and expectations of SRL were examined through quantitative data collection. Several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, though most SRL are aware of the existence of a resettlement programme, they lack basic knowledge about its functioning. Registration with UNHCR and the presence of field partners (NGOs) were identified as key factors in raising resettlement awareness and understanding. Secondly, SRL set high expectations both for themselves and the host countries. Personal expectations of SRL conveyed the idea that their legal situation constitutes a heavy burden; resettlement is viewed as a path towards a greater enjoyment of their rights, notably the rights to security of person, education and work. SRL also emphasised the importance of human dignity in the context of forced displacement. Expectations vis-à-vis host countries revealed the existence of a responsibility-resilience dilemma: the resettlement country is surely a duty-bearer, but refugees’ resilience is also key to success in the post-arrival phase. Canada was identified as the country that best meets expectations of SRL today. To conclude, even though resettlement opportunities exist for SRL, many challenges lie ahead to optimise the use of the resettlement programme implemented by UNHCR in Lebanon. Raising awareness, managing expectations and increasing the visibility of resettlement countries must be regarded as priorities.

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ANNEX - FORM FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON (ENGLISH VERSION)

1) Where do you live (city)?
2) Are you registered with UNHCR?  o Yes  o No
3) What is your gender?  o Male  o Female
4) How old are you?
5) What is your education level?  o No education  o Primary school  o Secondary school  o University
6) Have you already heard of the possibility of being “resettled” in another country?  o Yes  o No
7) If so, how did you learn about the programme?
   o UNHCR staff
   o Friends
   o Internet (social media etc.)
   o other (explain):
8) If you could be resettled, what country would you choose? Why?
9) What is the most important to you?
   o finding safety for my family
   o building a new life (integrating + finding a job/getting an education)
   o my children’s future
10) Select your preferred answer. “I believe that…
     o life will be difficult when I arrive, I will have to solve problems by myself."
     o the government will do its best to help me in my everyday life."
     o the government must help me in my everyday life."
11) Do you know someone who has been resettled?
    If so, in what country? What did this person tell you about his/her experience?
12) What is the most important thing you could find in another country that you do not have here in Lebanon?
13) How would you feel if your expectations were not met in the resettlement country?
   o sad and frustrated
   o angry at myself
   o angry at the host country
   o I would ask to return to Lebanon
14) In your opinion:
   o Every refugee can be resettled: yes/no/idk
   o I can choose the country I want to be sent to: yes/no/idk
   o Other members of my family can join me after my arrival: yes/no/idk
   o The government will provide me with a job: yes/no/idk
   o The government will provide me with a house: yes/no/idk
   o I will receive a monthly allowance: yes/no/idk
   o I will have access to free health care: yes/no/idk
   o I will have access to free language classes and training courses: yes/no/idk
   o My children will be able to go to school: yes/no/idk
   o In Europe, host communities are welcoming to refugees: yes/no/idk
   o I will integrate easily and quickly: yes/no/idk
   o I will be able to practice my religion freely (wear hijab, for example): yes/no/idk
   o I will be able to send money to my family: yes/no/idk

Thank you for your help!
LES REPERCUSSIONS ECONOMIQUES DE LA CRISE SYRIENNE AU LIBAN

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L'évaluation des coûts et bénéfices liés à l'accueil massif de réfugiés s'impose à l'agenda de la communauté internationale depuis les années 1970 (UNHCR, 1998). Cette question brûlante, de par son imprécision avec les logiques politiques, mobilise une multiplicité d'acteurs – politiciens, institutions internationales, chercheurs ou acteurs de l'aide humanitaire – ce qui vient entraver l'émergence d'une analyse nuancée prenant en compte les diverses facettes de cette problématique. Comme le pointe Richard Parsons (2016), ces études restent souvent cantonnées à l'analyse des coûts immédiats au niveau des finances nationales, et traduisent ainsi un raccourci dans l'analyse d'impact. L'évaluation des bouleversements de l'économie nationale, se limitant souvent à l'analyse du PIB et du budget, laisse en effet de côté l'étude de l'impact local de l'accueil des réfugiés, qui est pourtant le niveau où les bouleversements sont les plus importants (UNHCR, 2011). Sortir de ce type d'analyse permet de prendre en compte la réalité locale et les bénéfices sur le temps long, et ainsi de préciser et de complexifier l'étude de ce phénomène.

Bien que les approches analytiques nuancées et multi-scalaires – dans lesquelles cherche à s’inscrire ce travail – permettent une compréhension plus précise et complète des impacts des migrations massives, leur mise en place est soumise à plusieurs défis ; le manque de données, l’absence de population témoin (World Bank, 2011), ou encore les biais liés aux commanditaires des études, viennent effectivement entraver la conduite de ces travaux (UNHCR, 1998). Afin de lutter contre ces obstacles, des modèles d'analyses prenant en compte de nombreux paramètres et utilisant une grande diversité d'indicateurs et de méthodologies de recherches, ont été mis en place. C'est le cas, par exemple, du modèle développé par Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Isabel Ruiz, Carlos Vargas-Silva et Roger Zetter, qui met en avant de nombreux indicateurs quantitatifs et qualitatifs au niveau national et local (World Bank, 2012), dont nous nous inspirerons pour cette analyse.

Dans le cas de la crise syrienne, la contemporanéité des événements vient s'ajouter comme difficulté supplémentaire, en ce qu'elle empêche la prise en compte des répercussions dans le temps long pour évaluer les effets de la crise. Si l'exercice est ainsi complexifié, il est rendu d'autant plus nécessaire que des discours mal informés peuvent avoir un impact immédiat sur l'action politique. Ainsi, face à une multiplication de discours populistes, journalistiques et des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) soulignant le « poids » de la crise syrienne au Liban, il est primordial d'amorcer une étude plus nuancée de son impact économique.

Depuis le début de l’embrasement syrien en 2011, le Liban est en première ligne d’une double crise qui, par l’afflux massif de réfugiés et la perte d’un partenaire économique important, met en péril la résilience libanaise. Dans un pays comptant approximativement 4,5 millions de Libanais, l’accueil de près d’1,5 millions de Syriens, selon les estimations de plusieurs organisations, entraine des répercussions d’ordre social, économique et politique importantes. Malgré un processus de prise en charge multilatéral – individuel, communautaire, associatif et institutionnel – l’accueil des réfugiés au Liban pose de véritables problèmes humanitaires ; environ 70% d’entre eux vivent avec moins de 3,86$ par jour en 2016 contre 49% en 2014 (Moukarzel, 2016), sans compter l’accès limité à l’éducation et les problèmes de santé. À cela s’ajoute une indignation grandissante des Libanais des classes populaires qui voient les aides et l’attention se concentrer sur les réfugiés syriens alors même qu’ils estiment subir de plein fouet la concurrence de ceux-ci dans l’accès au logement et à l’emploi, et que leur situation économique se détériore. L’incapacité des autorités à mettre en place une réponse globale et cohérente pèse de manière accrue sur l’économie et les relations entre communautés d’accueil et réfugiés à mesure que la crise s’intensifie. De plus, la perte d’un partenaire historique joue fortement dans les fluctuations à la baisse du commerce extérieur libanais.

68. Les administrations libanaises ne menant pas de recensement, ce chiffre est une moyenne issue de la comparaison de plusieurs sources (France Diplomatie, 2017; Banque Mondiale, 2017).
70. Si ce sentiment de favoritisme envers les Syriens est souvent souligné par les populations locales plutôt défavorisées, il est néanmoins important de noter que certains programmes d’aides sont également disponibles pour les Libanais.
En 2010, l'économie libanaise sort d'une période pendant laquelle la croissance moyenne du PIB est supérieure à 3% par an, et allant même jusqu'à 8% pour la période 2008-2010 (Abdallah, 2013). Bien que cette tendance soit largement due à des facteurs externes, lorsque la crise syrienne prend de l'ampleur et que le FMI enregistre une croissance de 1,5% pour l'année 2011, puis 2012, la faute est directement rejetée sur le grand nombre de réfugiés syriens. Pour autant, l'explication de ces chiffres, et de l'évolution de l'économie libanaise, est bien plus complexe.

La crise syrienne et les logiques qui en découlent ont, en effet, fortement impacté les dynamiques économiques du pays du Cèdre. En se basant sur des rapports d'ONG, de centres de recherches et d'institutions internationales, il conviendra d'analyser ces répercussions, afin de comprendre dans quelle mesure l'évolution des relations entre les deux pays, la présence de cette crise aux frontières libanaises et l'afflux des réfugiés syriens ont agi sur l'économie libanaise.

Afin de cerner la complexité de ce phénomène, il conviendra de déconstruire le présupposé selon lequel l'arrivée massive des réfugiés est directement venue déstabiliser l'économie nationale. Par ailleurs, il semble nécessaire d'analyser les questions de l'emploi et de la compétition dans l'accès au marché du travail entre Syriens et Libanais. En dernier lieu, une étude des bouleversements économiques liés à l'afflux des ONG et organisations internationales, permettra de proposer une analyse plus complète de la problématique.

UNE DESTABILISATION DE L'ÉCONOMIE GLOBALE DU PAYS ?

Depuis 2011, la crise syrienne, dans son ensemble, a eu des répercussions multiples sur l'économie libanaise. L'accueil des ressortissants syriens fuyant la guerre a joué sur les tendances économiques, mais la proximité du Liban avec la guerre civile syrienne et la transformation des relations bilatérales qu'elle induit ont également impacté la structure de l'économie.

La Syrie est un partenaire économique majeur pour le Liban depuis des décennies ; les commerçants libanais empruntaient de nombreuses routes commerciales terrestres passant par la Syrie, notamment pour atteindre les marchés du Golfe. La fermeture des frontières a ainsi eu un impact important sur le commerce extérieur légal. La région de la Bekaa, dont l'économie repose en grande partie sur l'agriculture, a été fortement touchée par la fermeture de ces routes commerciales : le commerce des olives et des pommes en provenance du Mont Liban et à destination des pays du Golfe, s'est trouvé amoindri (Ghanem, 2016 ; Al-Masri et Abla, 2017). L'import des intrants agricoles depuis la Syrie s'est aussi arrêté, faisant augmenter les prix de ces produits et impactant directement les agriculteurs (Hamade, 2016). De plus, la décision des autorités syriennes de mettre fin à l'importation des produits libanais en 2014 a soutenu cet affaissement du commerce extérieur. Il est néanmoins important de noter que si les canaux officiels et légaux ont été fortement touchés par la guerre civile en Syrie, de nombreux canaux de contrebande ont émergé, notamment pour fournir des produits dérivés du pétrole et des produits de base. On les voit se développer au niveau des postes-frontières contrôlés par le régime en Syrie et par le Hezbollah au Liban (Abdallah, 2013). Bien que leur impact et leur ampleur soient difficiles à mesurer, ces réseaux ont permis de limiter l'impact de la diminution du commerce officiel. Il convient par ailleurs d'ajouter que si le commerce extérieur agricole a connu une baisse, l'arrivée des syriens dans les zones frontalières agricoles a permis de stimuler la demande et a entraîné un investissement accru dans l'agriculture et la production agro-industrielle (Hamade, 2016), permettant de moderniser le secteur.

Néanmoins, la crise syrienne a aussi entraîné le départ de nombreux ressortissants étrangers du Liban, et plus particulièrement des citoyens des pays du Golfe. Alors que leurs investissements ont fleuri dans le pays depuis les accords de Doha en 2008, l'enfoncement dans la crise a mené au départ de nombreux ressortissants étrangers du Liban et à destination des pays du Golfe, s'est trouvé amoindri (Ghanem, 2016 ; Al-Masri et Abla, 2017). De plus, la décision des autorités syriennes de mettre fin à l'importation des produits libanais en 2014 a soutenu cet affaissement du commerce extérieur légal. La région de la Bekaa, dont l'économie repose en grande partie sur l'agriculture, a été fortement touchée par la fermeture de ces routes commerciales : le commerce des olives et des pommes en provenance du Mont Liban et à destination des pays du Golfe, s'est trouvé amoindri (Ghanem, 2016 ; Al-Masri et Abla, 2017). L'import des intrants agricoles depuis la Syrie s'est aussi arrêté, faisant augmenter les prix de ces produits et impactant directement les agriculteurs (Hamade, 2016). De plus, la décision des autorités syriennes de mettre fin à l'importation des produits libanais en 2014 a soutenu cet affaissement du commerce extérieur. Il est néanmoins important de noter que si les canaux officiels et légaux ont été fortement touchés par la guerre civile en Syrie, de nombreux canaux de contrebande ont émergé, notamment pour fournir des produits dérivés du pétrole et des produits de base. On les voit se développer au niveau des postes-frontières contrôlés par le régime en Syrie et par le Hezbollah au Liban (Abdallah, 2013). Bien que leur impact et leur ampleur soient difficiles à mesurer, ces réseaux ont permis de limiter l'impact de la diminution du commerce officiel. Il convient par ailleurs d'ajouter que si le commerce extérieur agricole a connu une baisse, l'arrivée des syriens dans les zones frontalières agricoles a permis de stimuler la demande et a entraîné un investissement accru dans l'agriculture et la production agro-industrielle (Hamade, 2016), permettant de moderniser le secteur.

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Pour autant, l’importance du secteur informel empêche d’avoir une connaissance précise des flux de capitaux entrants, et les chiffres officiels ne représentent pas la réalité de l’économie libanaise. « En août 2014, il est estimé que le capital syrien dans les banques a atteint $14 millions » (Ashkar, 2014) ; selon l’auteur, entre l’arrivée de capitaux syriens et la stimulation du marché locatif, la crise syrienne, au moins jusqu’en 2014, n’a pas eu d’effet négatif sur le marché immobilier libanais au niveau global. Il reste important de préciser qu’évaluer les impacts sur le marché immobilier revient à prendre en compte une multiplicité de facteurs tels que les fluctuations de la demande, l’offre de logement, ou encore le prix de matériaux de construction (World Bank, 2012). Ces évolutions viennent impacter les individus de différentes manières qu’ils soient des habitants à faibles revenus ou des investisseurs immobiliers. Ainsi, si au regard de l’auteur la crise syrienne n’a pas eu d’impact négatif jusqu’en 2014 sur le niveau global de l’économie, il est néanmoins nécessaire de prendre en compte ses répercussions locales et les difficultés auxquelles font face certaines populations dans les régions accueillant de nombreux réfugiés.

Si la crise syrienne a produit des bouleversements divers dans l’économie libanaise, ces changements ne viennent pas exclusivement de l’accueil des réfugiés, mais également de la proximité du Liban avec la Syrie et des logiques régionales que la crise suscite. Ces changements ne sont néanmoins pas aussi négatifs que dépeints dans les discours, et se révèlent, au contraire, être beaucoup plus nuancés.

**LE PROBLEME DE L'EMPLOI ET LA COMPETITION SUR LE MARCHE DU TRAVAIL**

Si le niveau global de l’économie est difficile à évaluer, l’impact de la crise sur les classes populaires est quant à lui plus visible. On voit se mettre en place une dynamique de concurrence entre les communautés d’accueil et les réfugiés syriens qui impacte profondément leurs relations.


Cette compétition, que la loi et la prégnance de l’informel empêchent de réguler, participe à un accroissement des tensions intercommunautaires entre Libanais et Syriens. Le cas du village de Majdal Anjar, où le nombre de réfugiés égale aujourd’hui
celui des locaux (UNDP, 2017), est très éclairant sur les problèmes pouvant surgir de ces tensions économiques. Plusieurs propriétaires de petits commerces ont commencé à protester contre les boutiques tenues par des Syriens, qui représentent une compétition « injuste » selon eux, du fait qu’ils reçoivent des aides des ONG et agences onusiennes (Save the Children, 2014). Ils ont ainsi demandé aux autorités locales de mettre en place une régulation des horaires d’ouverture ainsi que d’imposer des tarifs fixes pour les pourvoyeurs de services (coiffeurs, barbiers, etc).

Cet exemple est représentatif de la perception d’une partie importante des Libanais. L’enquête menée par le SFCG et le UNHCR (2014) montre que, pour les locaux interrogés, les problèmes liés à l’emploi représentent le premier facteur explicatif des tensions entre les communautés (71%). Bien que le gouvernement ait pris en compte ce problème, procédant à une vague de fermeture des entreprises syriennes illégales en septembre 2013 ou encore avec l’appel du Ministre du Travail recommandant aux entreprises libanaises d’employer des locaux en août de la même année (Abdallah, 2013), aucune réforme d’ampleur n’a vu le jour afin de donner une réponse globale et de dépasser cette concurrence nuisible aux rapports entre Libanais et Syriens.

Par leur installation, majoritairement à Beyrouth, ces acteurs de l’aide internationale agissent sur l’économie locale ; à travers leur consommation de biens, ils affectent le marché locatif beyrouthin en accentuant la tendance inflationniste latente. Comme cela est pointé dans un entretien mené par une journaliste de l’Orient-le Jour (2017), « depuis le début de la crise syrienne, les prix des loyers à Beyrouth ont augmenté de 150%, voire 200% ». Les expatriés travaillant dans les ONG touchent des salaires largement au-dessus de la moyenne locale, et les jeunes beyrouthins voient leur accès au marché locatif se restreindre. Ces nouveaux arrivants sont aussi des consommateurs de services locaux (transport, logement, carte téléphonique) et influencent ainsi la structure du PIB en appuyant la tendance existante de l’accroissement des services à défaut des activités productives comme l’industrie.

La présence accrue d’organismes internationaux se traduit également par des créations d’emploi, directes et indirectes (Grünewald, 2014). Bien qu’une partie importante du personnel de ces organisations provienne de pays étrangers, celles-ci recrutent également dans le pays d’accueil. C’est le cas du Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés des Nations Unies qui embauche généralement une partie de son personnel parmi les locaux (UNHCR, 2011). Le Danish Council of Refugees a également vu ses effectifs au Liban augmenter depuis le début de la crise, notamment par le déplacement d’une partie du personnel opérant en Syrie à Beyrouth. Que ce soit le bureau pour le Liban ou pour la Syrie, une majeure partie des effectifs est recrutée au sein de la population libanaise ou syrienne2. L’arrivée de ces organismes entraîne également la création d’emplois indirects, par leur fonctionnement quotidien, avec le recrutement de personnel d’entretien (cuisiniers, chauffeurs, etc). Pour autant, ce recrutement, bien que stimulant le marché du travail, propose des emplois précaires puisqu’ils disparaîtront avec la fin de la crise et le retrait d’une partie de ces organismes une fois leur mission achevée.

Un autre aspect de l’influence des organismes internationaux se perçoit dans les initiatives de « transfert de pouvoir d’achat » (Grünewald, 2014) à travers la distribution par le UNHCR de liquidités à destination des réfugiés et dans celles d’assistance dans l’accès au logement. Ces formes d’intervention tendent à redynamiser les marchés locaux, en soutenant les commerces, le marché locatif et en venant aider à la rénovation des bâtiments – profitant ainsi aux propriétaires libanais qui en bénéficient gratuitement. Pour autant, elles peuvent également avoir des effets néfastes en déstabilisant

72. Données recueillies au cours d’un entretien avec une employée de DRC Syrie, travaillant à Beyrouth.
les équilibres du marché ; c'est ce que pointe une étude de International Alert (2015) dans le cas de Wadi Khaled. Dans ce village du nord-est libanais, le travail des ONG et organisations internationales a entraîné une hausse du prix des logements, limitant les possibilités d'accès au logement des jeunes libanais73. Par ailleurs, l'aide monétaire apportée aux réfugiés pour se nourrir en produits alimentaires et de première nécessité est souvent utilisée dans des commerces ouverts par d'autres Syriens. Ainsi le sentiment que cette aide humanitaire ne vient soutenir que les populations syriennes se développe. Les répercussions négatives de l'assistance humanitaire participent à renforcer le rejet des organisations internationales de la part d'une partie de la population, tout en accroissant les tensions intercommunautaires. Elles viennent alors faire de l'ombre aux aspects positifs que cette aide engrange, qui sont souvent passés au second plan.

Pour autant, ces derniers sont particulièrement importants à prendre en compte ; l'investissement massif de capitaux par les donneurs internationaux – par le biais des ONG – et les organisations internationales vient appuyer l'emprunt d'une nouvelle voie proposant un développement plus soutenable pour le pays. Par un engagement sur le long-terme, ces projets bénéficieront au Liban dans les années à venir en soutenant le développement des régions périphériques par la mise à niveau et la création d'infrastructures. Alors que les gouvernements successifs ont misé sur un surdéveloppement de Beyrouth, ces investissements peuvent permettre de redynamiser l'arrière-pays et de limiter les inégalités économiques existantes entre les différentes parties du territoire.

Ainsi, que ce soit par une présence accrue des travailleurs de ces organismes ou par leur travail sur le terrain, ces ONG et organisations internationales ont un effet direct et indirect sur l'économie locale libanaise. Parce qu'en venant en aide à certains groupes, et en s'implantant dans le pays, elle déstabilise certains équilibres, cette aide humanitaire est souvent mal perçue par les locaux, et vient parfois renforcer les tensions qui surgissent entre population réfugiées et populations d'accueil. Pour autant, elle reste nécessaire à la prise en charge de la « crise des réfugiés » et à la poursuite d'un développement plus uniforme du pays.

Comme nous avons pu le voir, il est difficile de mesurer les coûts et impacts de la crise syrienne sur l'économie libanaise. D'une part, l'importance du secteur informel qui caractérise le marché du travail empêche de calculer l'impact de l'arrivée massive de travailleurs syriens sur le niveau de chômage des travailleurs locaux. D'autre part, il est impossible d'isoler chaque facteur pour analyser son impact et son poids sur l'économie. Si l'arrivée des réfugiés a entraîné des bouleversements économiques au Liban, la structure de celle-ci a également été impactée par la présence de la guerre aux frontières du pays. Ce nouveau contexte a certes entraîné des transformations économiques, nocives dans certains cas, mais il offre également des perspectives de développement qui bénéficieront certainement au pays sur le long terme. Ainsi, les dépenses nationales liées à l'accueil des populations sont à mettre en perspective avec l'impact économique réel de ces arrivées, au niveau local, et avec les bénéfices – quantitatifs et qualitatifs – engendrés par celles-ci. La difficulté de cet exercice d'évaluation se fait alors sentir dans l'impossibilité d'assigner des coûts et bénéfices relatifs à des paramètres pas toujours mesurables.

Il est néanmoins certain que plus le pays s'enfonce dans cette crise, plus le besoin d'une solution viable sur le long terme se fait prégnante (Zetter, 2014). En refusant de s'engager directement sur la question, et ainsi de mettre en place un plan d'action global et cohérent dans la gestion de l'accueil des réfugiés (Dionigi, 2016), les autorités libanaises se privent d'un moyen de renforcer la structure étatique et d'intégrer les ressources que représentent les réfugiés à la société libanaise (Jacobsen, 2002). Par ce manque d’action, ils empêchent de mettre fin au glissement du pays vers la déstabilisation et la montée des tensions intercommunautaires.

73. On note ici que le marché locatif se voit doublement impacté par l'arrivée des ONG et organisations internationales. D'une part, il voit ses prix augmenter à Beyrouth où sont logés la plupart des employés ; de l'autre, leur travail bouleverse le marché dans les régions reculées qui accueillent de nombreux réfugiés.
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